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AbstrAct
This paper examines the crucial role the idea of history plays in John 
Stuart Mill’s social and political thought. Insofar as Mill argues that histori-
cal change and progress are synonyms, the latter deserves a careful attention. 
However, academic literature has mostly regarded Mill’s philosophy of histo-
ry a topic of minor importance. Some of his philosophical views on history, it 
will be argued, clearly affect his political views, but they also inform his sci-
entific study of society. Accordingly, historical research aims both at under-
standing the past to guide society’s future. By analysing the different sources 
from which Mill draws inspiration, the paper considers his views against the 
background of his personal and intellectual context. Mill’s temporary depres-
sion, along with Macaulay’s criticism of the utilitarian ahistorical conception 
of politics, triggers an enquiry into the appropriate method to study society, 
which eventually places history at its core. His reading of Coleridge and a 
number of French thinkers reflects a renewed interest in the discipline. The 
article discusses, first, Mill’s interpretation of Coleridge as Bentham’s op-
posite pole. Later in the article, I highlight Mill’s debts to Comte and Saint-
Simon, especially as regards what he calls the “Inverse Deductive Method”. 
Some remarks on French historiographers, like Mignet, Dulaure, Sismondi, 
Michelet and Guizot, also support my argument.
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I
Towards the end of his life, John Stuart Mill was elected Rector at the 
University of St. Andrews, Scotland. In his inaugural public address, Mill 
argued that:
All true political science is, in one sense of the phrase, à priori, 
being deduced from the tendencies of things, tendencies known 
either through our general experience of human nature, or as the 
result of an analysis of the course of history, considered as a pro-
gressive evolution (CW XXI, 237).
The quotation introduces the initial discussion for this article, which can 
be further formulated by two questions: What is the role of history in John 
Stuart Mill’s social and political thought? And, what does it mean to regard 
history “as a progressive evolution”? Mill’s answer to both questions, origi-
nally presented in the late 1820s, went unchallenged for the remainder of his 
career. The speech, written when he was around sixty years old, stands as an 
example of Mill’s firm views on history (CW I, 287).2
It is interesting to note that scholarly research has mostly considered 
Mill’s philosophy of history a topic of minor importance, despite the fact that 
he believes “that it was responsible for the most radical change that occurred 
in his thought” (Bouton 1965, 569). With exceptions, mainly methodological 
studies in the social sciences examine the matter. This article aims, rather, to 
study the significance of Mill’s views on history against the background of his 
personal and intellectual context, for it offers, on the one hand, an interpreta-
tion of his temporary depression or “mental crisis” and the subsequent intel-
lectual development in his early twenties. On the other hand, it provides an 
opportunity to explore some key aspects of his interest in French thought and 
his relationship with French intellectuals.
History, as “the record of all great things which have been achieved by 
mankind” (CW XVIII, 145), has to explain the progress of society. In other 
words, it aims to describe the patterns that historical events show. The idea of 
progress plays a prominent role in Mill’s philosophy of history. However, if 
we consider all the senses in which Mill uses the concept of progress through-
out his work, it becomes clear that touches upon a variety of topics, such as 
economic growth and wealth or moral improvement. Whereas Kurer or Har-
ris present a somewhat loose though general overview of Mill’s concept of 
2 Three years before Mill had published Auguste Comte and Positivism, where he dealt 
with historical issues in similar terms (CW X, 306-8).
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progress, this essay will exclusively focus on the idea of progress as regards 
history (Kurer 1991; Harris 1956).
II
In England, by the time Mill turns to writing, history as a discipline is 
still in its infancy. As Cairns remarks, his “life coincided with the rise of the 
modern historical profession” (Cairns 1985, xxv). More precisely, “the shift 
towards professional status, and a changing social role for historians, effec-
tively began during the middle decades of the nineteenth century” (Harrison 
et al. 2004, 16; for a wider perspective see Levine 2002). It was not the same 
case in Germany or France. Unlike her continental neighbours, Britain does 
not “need a history of the present dedicated to protesting its potential as a 
modern state” (Bentley 2011, 205). Mill, who praises French historiography 
in an 1826 review, is aware of the imbalance and admits the flaws of his own 
country in this respect (CW XX, 17-8, 260).3 Still by 1853, he notes “how 
new an art of writing history is, how very recently it is that we possess histo-
ries” (CW XI, 328). Taking into account the development of historiography, 
Mill’s views on a new science of the past are to be seen as a great novelty. 
Moreover, it explains why Mill’s philosophy of history merges sometimes 
with analyses of French historians: “historical thought becomes philosophy of 
history” (Bouton 1965, 570).
The poor state of British historiography may be one of the reasons why 
Mill’s education, though involving the study of Scottish historians, lacks a 
sense of the philosophical and scientific value of history.4 However, Mill 
slides into a depression about 1826 in which he questions his own philosophi-
cal ideas and revises personal beliefs. As he recalls in his Autobiography, the 
teachings received from his father, James Mill, and Jeremy Bentham, were 
put into question (CW I, 139). Yet what is more interesting is not how he feels 
during the crisis, for it lasts only a few months, but what may be understood 
as a longer and more complex process of gaining intellectual independence. 
According to Hayek “it is from the recovery from that depression toward the 
end of 1828 that we must probably date the beginning of his career as an in-
dependent thinker” (Hayek 1942, 10; see also Robson 1968, 76). The famous 
3 As Philips observes, Mill “pays full compliments to the earlier generation, while at the 
same time denying that their work should be considered history at all” (Philips 2000, 42). Else-
where, Burns has argued that Mill thinks of his father’s History of British India as part of this 
tradition (see Burns 1976, 10).
4 The fact that Mill began reading some historians when he was just four years old sug-
gests that history was for him an entertainment (CW I, 554).
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mental crisis is the preface to his public career, in which he looks upon history 
as worthy of philosophical study.
A year after his recovery, in 1829, James Mill’s Essay on Government 
receives a demolishing attack from Thomas Macaulay (Macaulay 1829). The 
historian criticises James Mill’s way of proceeding a priori in politics, sug-
gesting instead his own empirical method. Macaulay’s criticism undermines 
John Stuart Mill’s convictions as a Benthamite, although he does not agree 
with either of them. Rather, he takes a stance between the two sides and ad-
vocates his own method to study society: the Inverse Deductive or Historical 
Method. In his own words, “a foundation was thus laid in my thoughts for the 
principal chapters of what I afterwards published on the Logic of the Moral 
Sciences” (CW I, 169). Mill is referring to the sixth book of his System of 
Logic, where we find his most extensive account on the method of socio-
logical enquiry and, hence, history. From this moment on, Mill observes, it 
becomes apparent that a “philosophy of politics supposes a previous theory 
of human progress, and that this is the same thing with a philosophy of his-
tory” (CW I, 169). Although the controversy between Macaulay and James 
Mill turns out to be crucial, the British historian will not be the only important 
figure in Mill’s process of intellectual autonomy.
Then, how does the new set of beliefs come about? To answer the question 
we have to analyse the influence of Coleridge and some French thinkers 
with whom Mill becomes acquainted. He begins to read Coleridge and the 
Coleridgeans in 1828, as a result of his friendship with some anti-Benthamite 
contenders at the London Debating Society (CW I, 159). Although Mill does 
not mention any interest on Coleridge’s works until this moment, he regards 
Bentham and Coleridge as philosophical counterparts. Subsequently he argues 
that “it would be difficult to find two persons of philosophic eminence more 
exactly the contrary of one another” (CW X, 120).
When it comes to their understanding of history there arises a manifest 
opposition. On the one hand, Bentham “assumes that mankind are alike in 
all times and all places” (CW X, 16). On the other hand, unlike his mentor’s, 
Coleridge’s philosophy is “concrete and historical” (CW X, 125). More ac-
curately, he ranks first among those “who inquired […] into the inductive 
laws of the existence and growth of human society” (CW X, 139). History 
represents for the Benthamites “a dusty record of the crimes and follies of 
mankind,” while for the Coleridgeans embodies “an inspiring chronicle of the 
gradual unfolding of society” (Packe 1954, 245; see also Preyer 1958, 16, and 
Burns 1976, 3).
The outcome of Mill’s reading of Coleridge is twofold. Most significantly, 
he becomes more sensitive to the great value of history for social and politi-
cal philosophy. About the Coleridgeans, Mill acknowledges that “the brilliant 
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light which has been thrown upon history during the last half century” comes 
from this school (CW X, 139). Furthermore, Coleridge partly influences 
Mill’s interest in studying the combined effect of order and progress in soci-
ety, an issue that becomes central in his System of Logic, where he deals with 
the necessary conditions for social stability and progressiveness5 (CW, VIII, 
917-25; Rosen 2003, 29-30; Bouton 1954, 573; Turk 1988, 171; on Coleridge 
see Edwards 2004, 284-300, and Morrow 1990, 115-20).
III
Mill keeps a long-lasting and fruitful relationship with a number of 
French philosophers and intellectuals. Besides, his lively interest in the 
country itself leads him to write a series of articles on French affairs, pub-
lished in the Examiner since 1830 to 1834 (CW XXII and XXIII; Mueller 
1956, 22-4). However, I agree with John Cairns when he states that “the 
casual reader of the few and sober pages” of Mill’s Autobiography in which 
he alludes to France “might not readily grasp what [the country] had been to 
him” (Cairns 1985, vii).
Mill’s interpretation of French thought reflects the new role that philoso-
phy of history is going to have in his outline of the new social and political 
sciences. I will illustrate this claim by analysing mainly the impact of Saint-
Simon and Auguste Comte on Mill’s point of views. Some French historiog-
raphers, like François Mignet, Jacques-Antoine Dulaure, Jean de Sismondi, 
Jules Michelet and François Guizot, deserve some attention, though brief in 
this article, since they also influence his renewed interest in history.
In 1820 Mill first visits France, where he “breathed [...] the free and genial 
atmosphere of Continental life” (CW I, 59). From that moment on, as observer 
and admirer, French literature captures the interest of the young Mill. In the 
1826 reviews of the works by Mignet, Dulaure and Sismondi, he indirectly 
conveys an ideal image of a professional historian. Mill, who criticises Du-
laure because he “does not look out for causes and effects” (CW XX, 51), 
praises Mignet as an example of a historian who combines “philosophical his-
tory” with “mere narrative” (CW XX, 3). In a preliminary form, Mill gives an 
account of the task of history that will characterise his later writings.
However, to judge by his description, for Mill the Saint-Simonian school 
was the most influential of the epoch (CW I, 171; Mueller 1956, 61). In 1829, 
Gustave d’Eichtal presents him some of their publications, among which is 
one of Comte’s seminal essays. Despite the fact that Comte had distanced 
himself from Saint-Simon as early as 1825 (Simon 1972, 140; on Mill’s first 
5 Actually, Mill reproduces a long extract from Coleridge in his Logic.
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impression about Comte see CW XII, 34-8), it is difficult to distinguish be-
tween the ideas of the two. To begin with, Saint-Simon’s doctrine influences 
Comte’s philosophy, as the latter was his disciple. In addition, the mentor ap-
propriates Comte’s historical philosophy (Packe 1954, 92). One of the main 
ideas they share is that organic and critical periods alternate in history. Mill 
elaborates on their works while discussing the topic in a series of articles (CW 
I, 173; Mueller 1956 61, 66; Hayek 1942, xxix). In an organic or natural state, 
“power and moral influence are […] exercised by the fittest persons whom 
the existing state of society affords”. On the contrary, a society that “contains 
other persons fitter for worldly power and moral influence than those who 
have hitherto enjoyed them” (CW XXII, 252), undergoes a transitional or 
critical period. According to Mill, society is passing through a “transitional 
state,” and thus overcoming a “natural state”, that is, “mankind have out-
grown old institutions and old doctrines, and have not yet acquired new ones” 
(CW XXII, 230).
Progress appears as a two-stage process: primarily, it takes place in a natu-
ral state when a society “moves onward” insofar as it does no collide with 
“the established order of things”. At a further step, whenever a transitional 
stage is left behind, society “resumes its onward progress, at the point where 
it was stopped before by the social system which it has shivered” (CW XXII, 
252). According to this theory, the progress of society never stops. More sig-
nificantly, an exhaustive enquiry into the past allows him to establish a pattern 
to predict the future, since natural periods are always followed by transitional 
periods. Even if Mill leaves a series of unfinished articles which he finds 
“lumbering in style” (CW I, 181), the idea will play a prominent role in his 
System of Logic.
Although finally published in 1843, as early as in 1831 Mill is elaborat-
ing that part of the argument (CW I, 167; CW XII, 79). During the meantime, 
between 1830 and 1842, the six volumes of the Cours de Philosophie Positive 
appear. Mill admits that he “gained much from Comte,” yet it is the Inverse 
Deductive Method what strikes him “as the one chiefly applicable to the com-
plicated subjects of History and Statistics” (CW I, 219). After his reading of 
the Cours’ last volume, Mill writes to the French philosopher that the Logic 
had to be revised (CW XIII, 561). Moreover, John Robson suggests that the 
chapters where Mill explains the Inverse Deductive Method are additions re-
sulting from their agreement (Robson 1974, lxxvi; Bain 1882, 72, 68). Indeed, 
Mill’s main borrowing from Comte (CW I, 219) provides him with a double 
strategy. By arguing for a methodology that enables a scientific study of soci-
ety, he establishes a direct link between the unfolding of history and political 
science, that is, between the past and the future.
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The Inverse Deductive Method, also called Historical Method, is “crucial 
to an understanding of his social philosophy” (Robson 1968, 150), since it 
is the key to the science of society or sociology. It aims at giving a rational 
account of historical change, that is, “the progressiveness of the human race” 
(CW VIII, 914). Historical facts, once analysed, unveil the “law of progress” 
which “enable[s] us to predict future events” (CW VIII, 914). In other words, 
the Historical Method should describe “the laws according to which any state 
of society produces the state which succeeds it and takes it place” (CW VIII, 
912, 930). Fortunately, this task “has become the aim of really scientific 
thinkers,” such as Comte (CW VIII, 930). Remarkably, the idea of “state of 
society” underlies Mill’s scheme of sociology. Following Comte, he describes 
a state of society as the “the state of civilization at any given time” (CW VIII, 
911-2). Accordingly, an advance in people’s knowledge, with its consequent 
shift in public opinion, brings about a transitional period, which, as Mill had 
previously argued, leads to progress (CW, VIII, 926; Rosen 2007, 138).
For Mill, progress and historical change are equivalent. More accurately, 
“Philosophy of History is generally admitted to be at once the verification, 
and the initial form, of the Philosophy of the Progress of Society” (CW VIII, 
930). Thus, the crucial question remains whether progress means general so-
cial improvement. Mill confidently asserts that “progress and progressiveness” 
are not synonymous with “improvement and tendency to improvement” (CW, 
VIII, 913), or, to be precise, society is not bound to improve. While reject-
ing historical determinism, he endorses the value of individual freedom. The 
progress of society, when it takes place, results from mankind’s actions, which 
suggests that Mill’s later defence of liberty fits in with his theory of history 
(Gibbins 1990, 101). Thus, every human action can be explained appealing to 
the state of society or the “general circumstances of the country”, yet it also 
depends on “influences special to the individual” or free will (CW VIII, 933).
Nevertheless, his rejection of historical determinism does not mask his 
optimistic beliefs: “the general tendency is, and will continue to be, saving 
occasional and temporary exceptions, one of improvement” (CW VIII, 914). 
This allows him to support Comte’s law of the three states (CW VIII, 928), 
according to which society goes from a theological to a metaphysical period, 
before reaching a positive stage. Again, for both Comte and Mill, people’s 
beliefs or “the progress of human knowledge” influence the pace of progress.
Mill publishes two reviews of Jules Michelet’s and François Guizot’s his-
torical essays in 1844 and 1845 respectively, which provide some insights 
into his own ideas concerning history. Mill reads with interest those historians 
who are at the “highest stage of historical investigation, in which the aim is 
not simply to compose histories, but to construct a science of history” (CW 
XX, 225). Among them, he believes, three French figures stand out: Michelet 
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and Guizot, but also Thierry (CW XX, 225, 221-2). Mill describes the course 
of history using two metaphors that reinforce both the Comtean notion of 
different stages of historical progress and history as a scientific discipline. 
History displays “a progressive chain of causes and effects”, which may be 
described as “a gradually unfolding web, in which every fresh part that comes 
to view is a prolongation of the part previously unrolled” (CW XX, 225).
However, Mill appreciates both Guizot’s style in writing history and his 
persuasive lectures on the origin of progress in European civilisation. Ac-
cording to Guizot, whereas ancient societies remain stationary, ruled under 
the influence of one single power, modern European civilisation permits a 
“systematic antagonism”, both social and political, which has made progress 
possible over the centuries (CW XX, 169). Mill first grasps the significance 
of countervailing forces from Coleridge’s ideas of permanence and progres-
sion and later from Comte’s complementary dichotomy between order and 
progress (CW VIII, 917-25). A few years later Guizot provides him with yet 
another insight into the benefits of elaborating the ideas of antagonism and 
social balance (Varouxakis 1999, 301-3).
IV
The aim of this article has been to highlight the crucial role the idea of his-
tory plays in Mill’s social and political thought. In doing so, it is worth paying 
attention to Mill’s usage of the concept of progress as a rhetorical device, 
which strengthens the link between a scientific understanding of history and a 
foreseeable future. Besides, a review of Mill’s both earlier and later writings 
casts new light on two interconnected topics: a temporary personal crisis in 
1826 and the considerable influence that French thinkers have exerted upon 
him since the 1820s.
Mill’s growing interest in history and his intellectual maturing process 
may be clarified by stressing the significance of three events that take place 
around 1829. First, Thomas Macaulay publishes a devastating criticism on 
James Mill’s Essay on Government, aimed particularly at his philosophical 
method and its political scope. Macaulay’s review leaves a deep impression 
on John Stuart Mill (CW I, 165), who takes up the challenge and suggests 
his own method to study society. Second, at The London Debating Society 
he makes the acquaintance of John Sterling, Frederick Maurice and Samuel 
Coleridge. Mill agrees with them on emphasising the importance of history 
for a satisfactory account of human experience. Strikingly, Mill begins read-
ing Coleridge as Bentham’s intellectual adversary, but ends up considering 
him a model. Third, also at the Debating Society, he meets Gustave d’Eichtal, 
who would become his guide to read Saint-Simon’s and Comte’s writings.
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Additionally, an outline of the three episodes help us understand why Mill 
rejects the Benthamite ahistorical way of treating politics and places history 
in the core of his social and political thinking. As Rosen writes, “Mill himself 
thought that progress in social science required the rejection of the geometri-
cal method of Bentham and his father and its replacement by the historical 
method of Comte, which he also associated with Coleridge” (Rosen 2007, 
139). Moreover, the three episodes culminate in the publication of various 
writings that illustrate his idea of history: A series of propagandistic articles 
titled The Spirit of the Age (1830-1), Bentham (1838) and Coleridge (1840), 
both monographs on “two great seminal minds” (CW X, 77), and Mill’s most 
systematic treatise on the philosophy of social science, A System of Logic 
(1843). Though, as Burns remarks, we do not have a substantial historical 
work, Mill’s philosophy of history is widespread throughout his writings 
(Burns 1976, 4). Ultimately, Mill’s changing attitude towards history provides 
an interpretation of his development as an independent thinker.
Likewise, most of the French scholarly literature Mill reads throughout 
his life deals with either history or the philosophy of history. According to 
Varouxakis, Mill has a “compulsive interest in France and an astonishing con-
versance with France and things French” (Varouxakis 2004, 45; on this topic 
see Mueller 1956). However, for Mill, it was Saint-Simon and Comte who 
best explained historical progress by conferring a scientific rank to the study 
of history and society. I have suggested, moreover, that by exploring Mill’s 
view of history we gain an insight into his relationship with French thought. 
To put it differently, one possible way to analyse Mill’s study of French con-
temporary thinking is by focusing on his historical writings.
For Mill, political philosophy is only possible as a philosophy of history. 
Furthermore, insofar as the progress of society becomes apparent by studying 
the history of mankind, political science faces a double task: it has to explain 
past events, that is, what he calls progressive change, while it also has to 
argue the conditions for future progress. Thanks to the historical method, Mill 
points out, “we may hereafter succeed not only in looking far forward into the 
future history of the human race, but in determining what artificial means may 
be used, and to what extent, to accelerate the natural progress in so far as it is 
beneficial”. History emerges eventually as essential to Mill’s social and po-
litical philosophy. Besides, given the privileged place that historical research 
occupies in Mill’s methodology of the social sciences, history aims both at 
understanding the past and guiding for “the noblest and most beneficial por-
tion of the Political Art” (CW VIII, 930).
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